

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.215
10 September 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on
Thursday, 10 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

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(Poland)

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Bulgaria:

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Mr. G. GHELEV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
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Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

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Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. R.M. TAIT
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Mr. V. VAJNAR
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Ethiopia:

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

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Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

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Mr. M. TELLO
Mr. J. MERCADO

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Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

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Mr. I. IACOB

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Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. A.A. RYABYKOV

Mr. M.N. SHELEPIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A.A. SALAM

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Sir Harold BEELEY

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Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the 215th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all I should like to welcome here Mr. Lind, the representative of Sweden, whom we already know, since he has previously participated in the work of the Committee.

The Soviet delegation has proposed that today's meeting of the Committee should be devoted to the discussion of two questions: the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries (ENDC/123). These are serious and important questions. Agreement on them would undoubtedly lead to a substantial reduction of tension in Europe, and not only in Europe either; it would also reduce the risk of war, help towards strengthening confidence in relations between States, and considerably advance the development of world events along the path to a stable peace.

The members of the Committee are, of course, familiar with the specific contents of the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. We propose that the States belonging to these two opposing military groupings should undertake to refrain from attack, the threat or use of force, in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, against one another or in their international relations in general. We also propose that those States should resolve all disputes by peaceful means only, and consult together should situations affecting the interests of both sides arise which are likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security.

At the meeting of the Committee held on 20 February 1963, the Soviet delegation, on the instructions of the Soviet Government, submitted to the Committee for consideration (ENDC/PV.100, p.37) a draft non-aggression pact (ENDC/77) in which all these provisions were set out in the generally-accepted legal treaty language. At the same meeting, and also at the 125th, 139th, 152nd, 160th and 184th meetings of our Committee on 26 April, 31 May and 16 August 1963 and 28 January and 16 April 1964 respectively, the Soviet delegation gave a detailed explanation of these provisions. Today we should like to focus attention mainly on the effects which the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would have on the international situation.

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What is the practical significance of concluding a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries? What changes would there be in the world if such a pact were signed? Obviously a non-aggression pact is not in itself a disarmament measure, since it does not provide for the immediate elimination of the material weapons and means of warfare. This cannot be denied. But it is equally unquestionable and obvious that the world would be quite different from what it is today if the States belonging to the two main opposing military groupings accepted a solemn obligation to refrain from aggression and the threat or use of force against one another or in their international relations in general.

If both sides -- the United States of America and its allies in NATO, and the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact -- were to declare in front of all States throughout the world, in front of the United Nations and world public opinion, that they had no aggressive intentions against one another or against any other States, this alone would be a powerful factor in strengthening mutual confidence in the international arena, a factor that would remove suspicions and doubts regarding each other's intentions. Many things in international affairs would become clearer and simpler, and many artificial barriers which now stand in the way of mutual understanding between the sides on controversial international issues would recede into the past.

It is not difficult to imagine how much easier it would be in these circumstances to solve the main problem which now divides the two sides -- and the failure to solve it is having the most unfavourable effect on the international situation as a whole. I refer to the problem of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on this basis. There can be no doubt that, in the conditions which would be brought about as a result of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, there would open up also wider ways towards the normalization of relations between the two German States -- the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, by helping to strengthen international confidence, would undoubtedly have a most favourable effect on the development of peaceful international co-operation as a whole.

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A non-aggression pact would become an effective factor in international relations which would actually reduce the danger of an outbreak of war. The obligation assumed by States under this pact not to attack each other and not to use force would constitute a definite deterrent, for any breach of this obligation would inevitably place the aggressor in a position of international isolation.

This is particularly true in these days, when the masses of the people have awoken to political activity and when they are watching carefully to see in which direction the leaders of States are conducting affairs in the international arena -- whether towards peace or towards war. It is beyond all doubt that the peoples would keep a close check on the implementation of the non-aggression pact. They would quite justifiably regard a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, which would include all nuclear Powers existing today, as a pact aimed at preventing an outbreak of nuclear war.

It should also be borne in mind that, by strengthening international confidence and reducing the danger of an outbreak of war, the conclusion of such a pact would undoubtedly facilitate a practical solution of the disarmament problem as well. Having received from one another solemn reciprocal undertakings to refrain from aggression, the States belonging to the two main military groupings would find it easier to reach agreement on the fundamental problems of a programme of general and complete disarmament. In solving each of these problems they would be able to base themselves on the fact of the existence of reciprocal undertakings not to use against one another -- or against other States -- the military machines which have been created by each grouping. In this sense a non-aggression pact might become a kind of bridge leading from the unsettled and unstable armed world of today, full of threats and anxieties, to the future world without armaments -- a world in which the possibility of unleashing war would be completely eliminated.

Everything we have just been saying about the favourable international effects of concluding a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries derives from the very logic of things, from the very nature of contemporary political relations. We do not think, therefore, that in the considerations we have put forward there are any revelations of what has hitherto been unknown to the participants in our negotiations. We should even like to observe that the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact

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States has long been meeting with understanding and support on the part of many States members of the Committee. Statements in support of this idea have at various times been made at meetings of the Committee by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, India, Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico, as well as by the representatives of the socialist countries. Only last Thursday the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, referred again in his statement to the importance of reaching agreement on this question (ENDC/PV.213, p.12).

We shall not be surprised if, in these circumstances, some representatives wonder why in fact a non-aggression pact has not yet been signed. In this connexion allow me to inform the Committee how things stand and why no progress has so far been made on the question of concluding a non-aggression pact.

You will remember that whenever in the past the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries have proposed to the NATO countries the signing of a non-aggression pact, the United States and its allies in that bloc have invariably refused to do so, which we always sincerely felt to be regrettable.

About a year ago, however, it seemed that there appeared to be some signs that the situation in regard to a non-aggression pact was beginning to change for the better and that this matter was apparently beginning to go forward. In fact, as a result of the negotiations held in Moscow in July 1963 in connexion with the drafting of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom undertook to discuss with their allies -- in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO respectively -- the question of concluding a pact. In the Moscow communiqué of 25 July 1963 it was stated that --

"The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three Governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants."

(ENDC/101, p.2).

That was the first encouraging sign. At a reception in the Kremlin on 5 August 1963 on the occasion of the signing of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, declared:

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"In our opinion, the next step should be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and the countries signatories of the Warsaw Treaty. The conclusion of such a pact would demonstrate to all nations that the States which are the most powerful militarily, and in the first place the nuclear Powers, had reached agreement among themselves with the object of avoiding a thermo-nuclear war. There is no doubt that all nations would welcome the achievement of such an agreement." (Pravda, 6 August 1963)

We know that at that time the Western statesmen reacted positively to that proposal. After the conclusion of the Moscow negotiations, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom made statements in which they referred to their interest in a non-aggression pact and their intention to take appropriate steps to continue negotiations on this matter. The Foreign Minister of Belgium -- another State belonging to the NATO alliance -- also spoke in favour of concluding a non-aggression pact (A/PV.1233, provisional, p.59-60). Many prominent political and public leaders in Italy, in the Scandinavian countries members of NATO, and in Canada expressed themselves in favour of a positive solution of this question as soon as possible. It seemed that the live shoot of a non-aggression pact was already forcing its way through the hard crust which had been formed in the relations between the two sides over the long years of the "cold war", and would soon emerge on the surface.

Need we say that we for our part did everything in our power to help events to develop in this way; in particular, we held consultations with our allies in the Warsaw Treaty regarding the conclusion of a pact and on the basis of these consultations, we confirmed to the Western Powers that we were ready to give a practical turn to the matter and to proceed to business-like negotiations on this question. With a view to removing all difficulties in the way of a speedy conclusion of a non-aggression pact -- particularly those relating to the recognition of the German Democratic Republic -- the Soviet Government took yet another important step. In a number of statements by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, it was emphasized that we were adopting a flexible attitude in regard to the form of the non-aggression pact, and that in particular we were prepared to try to find a form which would not give rise to any special difficulties and would be mutually satisfactory to both sides.

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But time has passed, and not only has there been no positive response from the Western Powers to our proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, but on the contrary it is becoming increasingly clear that they are evading negotiations on this matter. This was shown by the increasingly negative statements on the question of a pact which the representatives of the NATO countries made in our Committee during the previous session. In doing so, they put forward the rather absurd view that the question of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries could not be discussed within the framework of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee at all (ENDC/PV.139, p.16).

Of course, we do not know why the Western Powers decided to change their position in regard to a non-aggression pact, or why, after they had shown definite interest in the conclusion of a pact, they later shifted to the position of a somewhat blunt rejection of practical negotiations on a pact. The representatives of the Western Powers have never explained here in the Committee why this happened, and we can therefore only make guesses and suppositions. But there are nevertheless certain facts which, in our view, justify our suppositions and give them a basis of reality. These facts are contained in the answer to the question who in NATO has from the very beginning been opposed, and still is opposed, to a non-aggression pact, and whose negative influence has affected, and still is affecting, the positions of the United States of America and other NATO members on the question of a pact.

If one approaches the matter from this angle, it will be found that there is only one NATO member State which has from the very outset adopted an irreconcilably negative attitude towards a non-aggression pact. This State is the Federal Republic of Germany. In official declarations by leading statesmen of the Federal Republic of Germany, it has been constantly emphasized in the past and is still being emphasized now that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries would not be in keeping with the political intentions and objectives of the Federal Republic of Germany. There is, of course, nothing surprising in this: for those who are guided by expectations of a revision of State frontiers in Europe, and for those also who are planning revanchist adventures, a non-aggression pact is an exceedingly undesirable obstacle in the way of achieving these objectives. It is regrettable, however,

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to have to note the fact that the influence of certain circles in the Federal Republic of Germany on the policy of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and other NATO members in regard to a non-aggression pact appears to be stronger than the interests of peace.

In connexion with this question, it must be pointed out that on the one hand the opposition of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and on the other hand the revenge-seeking aspirations of Western Germany and its insistent claims to be given access to nuclear weapons, at first within the framework of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, are all links in a single chain; they are all elements of a general aggressive political policy.

Last Thursday the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, emphasized in his statement (ENDC/PV.213, p.26) that the Western doctrine excludes aggression. But the Western Powers have no better opportunity of proving this than by agreeing to conclude a non-aggression pact. I think there is no surer way for them to convince world opinion that their intentions are far from the interests of peace than by continuing to evade the conclusion of this pact. The Soviet Union, like the other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, is ready to begin practical negotiations on a non-aggression pact at any time, on any day. It is up to the Western Powers.

I now turn to another question. While the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries would bring about that lessening of the political tension in the international atmosphere which the peoples so earnestly desire, another very considerable practical step in the direction of reducing military tension -- that is, lessening the danger of a direct military conflict between the States belonging to the two main groupings -- would be the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries and the elimination of foreign military bases in these territories.

The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, like the question of a non-aggression pact, is not a new one for the Committee. It has been discussed a number of times throughout the three years of our work, and we are sure that most members of the Committee are quite familiar with this question and, of course, realize all its significance. Today, therefore, we should like to deal merely with certain aspects of the question of the withdrawal

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of foreign troops from the territories of other countries -- those aspects which have acquired particularly great importance against the background of certain well-known events in recent times.

First of all, we should like to draw attention to one aspect of the matter: namely that in recent times a number of events which have seriously complicated and inflamed the international situation have been connected with the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries. It is well known, for example, that the crisis in and around Cyprus has been brought about primarily and above all by the desire of certain Powers to maintain their military bases in Cyprus and in one way or another to turn the island of Cyprus into a military base, into a military springboard for the North Atlantic bloc. It is equally well known that the main factor preventing a peaceful solution to the South Viet-Nam problem is the virtual occupation by the United States of Viet-Nam territory, where there are now tens of thousands of American troops, while a United States naval fleet is cruising in the waters around the Indo-China Peninsula and its forces have recently been used by the United States to undertake aggressive acts -- the bombing of a number of points in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

Tension in the Caribbean area, which is fraught with the possibility of developing at any moment into a new international crisis, is to a large extent connected with the provocative acts which are being undertaken against the Republic of Cuba from Cuban territory occupied by the United States military base at Guantanamo. The events of recent months in Panama, Gabon, Kenya and Tanganyika and a number of other regions of the world demonstrate over and over again the dangers involved in the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries and the maintenance of foreign military bases in these territories.

We have always maintained that the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries in peace-time is an abnormal phenomenon, connected with the essentially aggressive designs of certain Powers. This has been confirmed by the entire development of events in recent times. If the United States maintains in the territory of other countries more than a million of its soldiers and officers -- that is, more than one-third of the entire armed forces of the United States --; if it has located in the territory of foreign countries hundreds of its military bases for strategical and tactical purposes, many of

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which have been adapted or are being adapted to serve as springboards for unleashing and waging nuclear war or local wars, including specific colonial wars; this cannot fail to leave its mark on the whole development of international relations. These troops, these bases are directed against someone, and we know perfectly well against whom they are directed.

On the one hand, the system of locating United States, United Kingdom and other foreign troops and military bases in the territories of other countries is one of the most important elements of the Western Powers' military machine, which is aimed against the socialist States. This is particularly obvious in Europe, where the presence of United States troops in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany is a sort of material basis of the alliance between the United States and West German militarism. Another eloquent example in this regard in recent times has been the use by the United States, with the agreement of the Japanese Government, of American bases in the territory of Japan for aggression against Viet-Nam and for armed attack against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

On the other hand, the United States, British, French, Spanish and Portuguese troops and military bases located on foreign soil in the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America constitute a most dangerous instrument of the colonial policy or the policy of neo-colonialism, the policy of shackling and subduing the young independent States which have acquired the right to independent development after a hard struggle. Foreign military bases are a malignant foreign body in the organism of young developing States, which unsettles their normal political and economic life. Foreign military bases are bridgeheads for the struggle against the national liberation movement, bridgeheads for interfering in the domestic affairs of other States.

Foreign military bases are also used by the old and new colonizers as springboards for unleashing and waging local wars. On this point the well-known United States military commentator, Hanson Baldwin, recently wrote very graphically that these bases -- the reference is to American and British military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America -- were extremely valuable for local war and any variety of it, from a repetition of the Korean version up to intervention of the Lebanon type. Local war, he said, called for rapid action by the navy and air force. Overseas bases made it possible to support these rapid actions and facilitated supplies to the

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troops. Transport aircraft for conveying troops had not an adequate range of operation to encompass the whole globe. They could not safely be refuelled in flight; they needed intermediate bases in the destination area.

The United States military commentator cannot be accused of insufficient candour or accuracy. He has described in very specific terms the role of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries in the mechanism of unleashing and waging aggressive local wars. But the colonizers have one approach to this matter, and nations which have taken an independent path of development have another. Events of recent times also demonstrate that the nations are calling more and more resolutely for the withdrawal of foreign troops and for the liquidation of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries; the governments of the young independent States of Asia, Africa and Latin America are taking with ever-increasing determination the path of practical action aimed at achieving their rightful aims.

The firm statement by the Government of Ceylon forbidding foreign naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons to put in at ports in Ceylon, or foreign military aircraft carrying nuclear bombs to land at airfields in Ceylon, is merely one of the facts of recent times which show which way and in which direction the development of events in the struggle against foreign military bases is moving. The Conference of the Heads of African States which was held in May 1963 in Addis Ababa, in expressing the will of the nations of the whole African continent, categorically emphasized the need to do away with the occupation of the African continent and military bases, stating that the elimination of these bases "constitutes a basic element of African Independence and Unity" (ENDC/93/Rev.1).

Libya's demand for the liquidation of United States and United Kingdom military bases in its territory; the decision of the National Assembly of the Republic of Chad on the withdrawal of all French troops from the country; the demand for the withdrawal of French troops from the territory of Upper Volta and the Central African Republic; the large-scale movement in Latin America for the elimination of United States military bases - all these are signs of the times, an expression of the genuine interest of peoples who do not want and who will not reconcile themselves to the presence of foreign troops in the territories of their countries or the establishment of foreign military bridgeheads on their soil.

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And the struggle of the peoples against foreign military bases is now already having positive results. It may be noted with satisfaction, for instance, that nearly all the north-African coast of the Mediterranean has already been, or is being, cleared of military bases: United States bases in Morocco have been eliminated, Tunis has secured the withdrawal of the French navy from Bizerta, French troops have been withdrawn from Algiers after 134 years of occupation, the United Kingdom base in Libya is being eliminated, and the question of the elimination of United States bases in that country has also been settled.

In saying all this, we should like to stress with all possible force the rightful demands of the young independent States of Asia, Africa and Latin America for the annulment of foreign treaties relating to foreign military bases, which are merely a legalized form of forcible alienation of the territories of weak States to the advantage of stronger States. Inequitable treaties of this kind are radically at variance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and are an infringement of the sovereignty of States. We also support the firm and courageous statement by the President of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abd el Nasser, calling for the elimination of all foreign military bases in the Near East and Mediterranean area. "They" -- that is, the military bases -- "are a threat to our security and must be destroyed", said the President of the United Arab Republic; and of course he is quite right.

The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries and of the elimination of foreign military bases is now an urgent one; it must be solved and as soon as possible. There is not and there cannot be any justification for a policy aimed at perpetuating the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries. All the -- save the mark -- "arguments" which have been advanced here in the Committee, as well as outside the Committee, in favour of maintaining foreign troops in the territories of other countries are devoid of any foundation whatsoever, if, of course, one takes into consideration the interests of the consolidation of peace and respect for the independence and sovereign rights of nations, and not a policy aimed at increasing international tension or a policy of colonialism.

In the past the Governments of the United States of America and other countries members of NATO have tried to justify their refusal to agree to the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries by alleging that this might

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upset the general correlation of forces of the States belonging to the two main military groupings, to the advantage of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. This argument was never valid in the past; and now that the military leaders of the NATO countries themselves, to judge by their statements, assume that the total strength of the NATO forces is not smaller but even greater than that of the Warsaw Treaty forces, it is simply pointless to put forward an argument of that kind.

The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries can be solved in different ways. Obviously the best method of solving it would be to reach agreement on the immediate and complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other countries, and the elimination of all foreign military bases in those territories. We should be prepared -- and we have repeatedly said so -- to withdraw all our troops from the territories of foreign countries in which they are now located, provided, of course, that the Western Powers do the same. We are in favour of this solution of the question.

But, since the Western Powers -- as their representatives state -- are not prepared to agree to the complete and immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other countries, we must seek for other methods of solving this problem. That, in fact, is why the Soviet Government, as is known, has also suggested that agreement should be reached first to reduce the number of foreign troops in the territories of other countries on a basis of reciprocity and then -- gradually, step by step -- to lead up to their complete withdrawal to within the boundaries of their national territories. We have indicated during the discussion of this question here in the Committee that the Soviet Union is prepared to undertake immediately the reduction of its troops in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and other European States, if the Western Powers begin to reduce their troops in the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries.

Unfortunately the Western Powers have so far not given a positive reply to this proposal of ours, which takes into account the position of the other side. In discussing this question in the Committee we cannot refrain from mentioning that once again, as in the case of the question of a non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union's proposal for the reduction of foreign troops, above all in the territory of the two German States, encounters opposition, as we realize, primarily on the part of the leading

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circles in the Federal Republic of Germany. Every time the question of reducing the number of foreign troops in the territory of the two German States comes up at the regular meetings of the NATO Council -- as one later learns from reports in the Press -- the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany oppose it; and it is this that actually determines the position of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada and other NATO members in the negotiations in the Committee.

Will it go on like that in the future? One would like to hope that it will not, and that the Governments of the United States of America and other States members of NATO will adopt a realistic attitude, a far-sighted attitude in keeping with the interests of the consolidation of peace in Europe, and that they will take the path of reducing, and then completely withdrawing, all foreign troops from the territories of both German States and from the territories of other countries. We are convinced that this would be a blessing to all European peoples, including the German people of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

Today we should also like to draw the Committee's attention to another measure proposed by the Soviet Government: namely the reduction of the total numbers of armed forces of States. The Soviet Government has always advocated a reduction in the armed forces of States, and the Soviet Union has more than once carried out a considerable reduction in its own army even unilaterally. We believe that more favourable possibilities have now been created for solving this question on a basis of reciprocity, without waiting for the beginning of the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament.

The Committee has before it other measures proposed by the socialist States, measures aimed at reducing and gradually removing the possibility of a military conflict between the armed forces of the two sides in sensitive areas where they are directly in contact with one another, particularly in the area of Central Europe. These measures include, first of all, the proposals of the Polish People's Republic to convert Central Europe into a nuclear-free zone and, as a first step, to freeze nuclear weapons in the area of Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1; PV.189, p.6). We are convinced that implementation of these proposals would create in the area of Central Europe a completely new situation in keeping with the interests of the peaceful life of the European peoples.

In the course of our negotiations we have frequently drawn the attention of members of the Committee to the constructive proposals which the Government of the German Democratic Republic has been putting forward with a view to normalizing the situation

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in the area of Central Europe (ENDC/124, 133). These proposals, which provide for the non-participation of the two German States in the nuclear arms race, are inspired by the desire to preclude any possibility of involving the German people in new military adventures and to create a situation in which the threat of a world-wide conflagration would not again take its rise from German territory. Today in this connexion we should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the new proposals which have been put forward by the Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Walter Ulbricht, in his statement at a meeting of the Volkskammer of the German Democratic Republic on 1 September 1964 in connexion with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War and the fiftieth anniversary of the First World War.

Under the new proposals of the Government of the German Democratic Republic the two German States would undertake, through independent declarations, not to manufacture nuclear weapons in their own territories or in the territories of other States either themselves or with the assistance of other countries, not to acquire and not to receive nuclear weapons or data relating to the manufacture of weapons or the conduct of research work; not to seek in any way, either directly or indirectly, through third States or through groupings of Powers, alone or in alliance with other States, to obtain the right to have nuclear weapons at their disposal; not to participate in any way in nuclear weapon tests; not to locate nuclear weapons in any way in their own sovereign territory and not to permit third States or groupings of Powers to do so; and never to use nuclear weapons themselves or through third States or groupings of Powers.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has also proposed that the two German States should appeal to the four Powers which signed the Potsdam Agreement to respect both German States as permanent nuclear-free zones and, if they have already located nuclear weapons on German soil, to remove them. The same proposals also provide that both German States shall undertake a considerable reduction in their military budgets and use the funds thus released for social purposes and for rendering assistance to developing countries.

We should like to hope that the good will displayed by the Government of the German Democratic Republic and its concern for the maintenance and security of peace, which have been so strikingly expressed in these new constructive proposals, will meet with a favourable response both in the Federal Republic of Germany and on the part of the other Western Powers.

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A substantial step forward in the direction of reducing international tension and the threat of war in Europe would, we think, be the implementation of the Soviet Government's proposal to create a network of observation posts in the territories of countries belonging to the two opposing groupings of States (ENDC/123, p.5) in conjunction with measures such as the reduction of the number of foreign troops in the territories of European States and a commitment not to locate nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet delegation does not harbour any illusion that, during the two meetings of the Committee still remaining before its work for 1964 is concluded, we shall succeed in achieving concrete agreements on the questions of a non-aggression pact, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, the reduction of the total numbers of armed forces of States, and various measures to reduce the danger of an outbreak of war in Europe. We do think, however, that objective possibilities already exist in the world for achieving positive solutions to all these important questions on which in many respects the maintenance and consolidation of peace depend, thus clearing the way to agreement on general and complete disarmament.

These possibilities must be turned into reality, and the Soviet Government is making unremitting efforts to that end. Up to now our efforts have not been supported as they should have been by the Western Powers. If in the remaining days before the recess in our work these Powers were to display even the first signs which would allow us to hope that they will be ready to adopt a more constructive position in regard to the proposals made by the socialist countries for measures to relax international tension and slow down the armaments race, this would undoubtedly improve the prospects for the negotiations on disarmament.

U SAIN BWA (Burma): First of all I should like to associate myself with the words spoken by the representative of the Soviet Union in welcoming Mr. Lind back to our Committee.

We have heard an interesting statement by the representative of the Soviet Union, on which it is not my intention to comment at this time. I shall study the verbatim record and make some comments at the appropriate time.

The subject for discussion today is measures aimed at halting the arms race and at lessening international tension. The main task of our Committee is to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Nevertheless, the Burmese delegation has always recognized the need for containing the disarmament problem while we continue to search for an agreement on disarmament. A non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries would bring about, no doubt, an easing of international tension and at the same time would create confidence between the socialist countries and the Western Powers.

During previous sessions we have expressed our support for the proposed non-aggression pact (ENDC/77), and we hope that the negotiations proceeding elsewhere will make it possible for such a pact to be concluded in the near future. Today we have heard from the representative of the Soviet Union the reasons why our hope still remains only a hope, because it has been found impossible to reach agreement. But, in spite of what we have heard, the delegation of Burma wishes to reiterate its support for a non-aggression pact and to ask the Powers concerned to continue their search for agreement.

Bearing in mind the fact that a halt in the arms race would contribute greatly to solving the problem of disarmament, my delegation suggested on 26 March consideration of certain collateral measures in combination (ENDC/PV.178, pp. 31 et seq.). I do not intend to repeat the reasons that prompted us to make that suggestion, but I hope you will allow me to mention briefly the collateral measures which we have suggested should be considered in combination. They are: President Johnson's proposal for a freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive missiles (ENDC/120), the Soviet Union's proposal for agreed reductions in military budgets, and the Soviet Union's proposal for the destruction of bomber aircraft (ENDC/123). Although our proposal has not yet been accepted by this Committee, we are gratified to note that some of the points that we raised did not go unheeded.

Here I should like to state briefly two points which we consider to be an advance in the positions of the two super-Powers. First, on 20 February we stated (ENDC/PV.168, p.7) that we saw no reason why the budgets of the main armed Powers -- and I emphasize the words "main armed Powers" -- should not be reduced by 10 to 15 per cent as proposed by the Soviet Union (ENDC/123). During the current session the Soviet Union has stated that the reduction of military budgets should apply first of all to the big Powers (ENDC/PV.191, p.17). We welcome that statement by the Soviet Union.

(U Sain Bwa, Burma)

Secondly, as regards the United States proposal for a verified freeze of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive missiles, we expressed the hope that further clarification would be forthcoming from the United States. We were happy to note that at the 211th plenary meeting the representative of the United States elaborated the proposal for the verified freeze. We welcome that proposal too. I do not intend now to make any other comments on the proposal, because I accept Mr. Timberlake's suggestion that it should be studied carefully while the Conference is in recess.

Following this line of thought concerning consideration of collateral measures which are complementary, the Burmese delegation feels that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries would help greatly in taking the Committee out of the impasse it is in with respect to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

With the Committee's permission, I shall now turn to another subject which has been discussed at length during the current session -- that is, the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. During previous sessions the delegation of Burma has expressed the view that, following the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the resolution banning the stationing and orbiting in space of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117), the logical next move would be to take all possible steps to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Naturally we were encouraged when, at the beginning of the present session, our two co-Chairmen suggested discussion of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

We have followed with great interest the discussions on this subject in our Committee. The nuclear Powers express their sense of the urgency and importance of the matter, but to our disappointment we find we are in an impasse. The proposed creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force has been the obstacle to our progress, because the Eastern and Western delegations hold opposite views in the matter. While the Western Powers consider that the creation of the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force is compatible with an agreement on non-dissemination, the socialist countries express the view that the two are incompatible. Because of this conflict of opinion, my delegation has given serious thought to how to reconcile the opposing views. I regret to say that so far I have been unable to find any ready solution; so, in our view, the only hope is that this question of an agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons will be kept open and that a solution will be found at our future sessions.

(U Sain Bwa, Burma)

Before concluding, I should like to mention that we are glad that our suggestion at our previous session (ENDC/PV.178, p.36) that the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests be reactivated in order to consider the concluding of a comprehensive test ban treaty has been acknowledged at last by at least one Power (ENDC/PV.209, p.12).

Those are the thoughts we wished to bring to the attention of the members of this Committee, and it is my delegation's hope that more fruitful work will be achieved at future sessions.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): We have little time left before the beginning of the session of the United Nations General Assembly, and even less time before the end of the Committee's present session. Obviously the fears of some delegations that the results of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee will be the subject of justifiable criticism by the General Assembly are fully warranted.

In this connexion I should like to emphasize that the statement made at the Committee's 213th meeting by the representative of the United States of America, Mr. Foster does not, I regret to say, contain anything which might strengthen and corroborate even the mildest optimism regarding the final results of our seven months' work this year as a whole and, in particular, of our negotiations on "collateral measures". We find it difficult to escape the impression that the representative of the United States has slammed (and very forcefully) the door which might have opened the way to the achievement of some results on the eve of the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. Foster's statement regarding the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons sounded particularly disappointing. All members of the Committee are well aware of the place and attention given in our discussions to this exceptionally important question, particularly in the discussions which began in June and have continued to the present day. Obviously it is no mere chance that the non-aligned countries represented in our Committee have concentrated their efforts in recent times on this particular problem. These efforts demonstrate convincingly how ardent and sincere is the desire of the non-aligned States of Africa, Asia and Latin America to help towards achieving an effective agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons so as to reduce the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and to slow down the nuclear arms race.

The constructive efforts of the delegations of the non-aligned countries represented here bear witness to their realistic approach to this important problem and to their desire actually to contribute towards solving it as speedily as possible. At the same time these efforts

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show a clear awareness of the fact that, in order to reach agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, it is essential that all the countries concerned should refrain from actions and measures which might directly result in the actual dissemination of nuclear weapons -- in other words, from actions which would in advance deprive a future agreement on this question of any value.

We are bound to note that --- as the socialist countries have already pointed out on a number of occasions -- the obstacle to the achievement of an agreement to prohibit the dissemination of nuclear weapons is the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force and to give the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons through this force. This is an undeniable fact, which the Western Powers have not been able, and will not be able, seriously to dispute. However much the representatives of the Western Powers have tried to convince members of the Committee that it is possible to reconcile the NATO multilateral force with an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the majority of the members of the Committee have stressed quite unequivocally that the multilateral nuclear force is, objectively, the sole obstacle to the solution of this problem.

Let us try to imagine what sort of situation there might be in the near future if the Western Powers stubbornly continue to pursue their present line. Following the example of the creation of the NATO multilateral force, other Powers -- let us say the members of SEATO and CENTO and so forth -- would create their own multilateral nuclear forces. As has been pointed out at our meetings, it follows from the logic of things that, if a concession were to be made to one organization, no one would be entitled to refuse to others what had been allowed to someone else -- in this case NATO. In a very short time nuclear weapons would be disseminated throughout the world on a "multilateral basis" on a scale that would lead us to the brink of catastrophe. Would it be possible to consider such a situation as being in keeping with the objective of restricting and preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons? Of course not; and the picture would look very gloomy indeed if one remembers a recent case when one of the NATO Powers used its part of the "multi-national" air force to carry out its own designs, and then returned this part to "multi-national" control as a matter of course.

On the subject of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, we cannot but compare once again the positions of the two German States in this regard. The reply of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Government's note (ENDC/137)

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of 15 July 1964 has been published in the Press. It is evident that the Bonn authorities cannot conceive of State sovereignty without nuclear weapons. Moreover, while supporting the militarists and revenge-seekers, at the same time they adopt the pose of providing for defence through access to nuclear weapons. How far from this attitude, so harmful for the cause of peace, are the peaceful proposals of the German Democratic Republic which Mr. Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the Council of State, expounded to the Volkskammer in Berlin on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the second world war!

Those proposals deserve serious consideration by the Committee. Although they have already been mentioned today, I venture to quote them -- or at least the part relating to nuclear disarmament. The proposals are as follows:

"Both German States undertake through separate declarations:

Not to produce nuclear weapons in their own territory or in the territory of other States, either themselves or with the help of anyone else;

Not to acquire and not to receive nuclear weapons or data relating to the production of nuclear weapons or the conduct of research work;

Not to seek in any way, either directly or indirectly, through third States or groupings of Powers, either alone or in alliance with other States, to obtain the right to dispose of atomic weapons;

Not to participate in any way in nuclear weapon tests;

Not to locate nuclear weapons in any way in their own sovereign territory, and not to permit third States or groupings of States to do so;

Never to use nuclear weapons either themselves or through third States or groupings of Powers".

The positions of the two German States on the question whether or not there is to be a nuclear catastrophe are as far apart as heaven and earth, as peace and war.

It is now clear to any unbiassed person that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force and the conclusion of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons are mutually exclusive. As the representative of the Soviet Union said quite rightly on 3 September:

"... it is impossible to reconcile ... an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons with any plans conducing to the actual dissemination of such weapons," (ENDC/PV.213, p.43).

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The socialist countries have pointed out that the NATO multilateral nuclear force is a form of dissemination of nuclear weapons. The most recent development in this connexion, to which one cannot refer without anxiety -- namely the decision taken by the United States of America to transmit secret information to other NATO members, which in essence constitutes an actual step towards dissemination -- only confirms the correctness of our conviction. In view of this attitude of the Western Powers, we regard as very appropriate the proposal of the representatives of the non-aligned countries concerning the urgent need to begin negotiations on the practical preparation of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The achievement of such an agreement does not brook the slightest delay.

But it will be possible to begin negotiations only if the Western Powers -- and primarily, of course, the United States of America -- cease to follow a course which on the one hand involves measures aimed at the further spread of nuclear weapons, and on the other hand is alleged to facilitate the achievement of an agreement. In that way they are deliberately excluding the possibility of starting negotiations. It seems that it was this aspect of the matter to which the representatives of the United Arab Republic, India and Nigeria were referring when they suggested that neither side should do anything that might lead to the actual dissemination of nuclear weapons, and that each side should refrain from any activities that might jeopardize the success of a possible agreement on non-dissemination. In our opinion this is undoubtedly a necessary and reasonable condition for reaching the final objective of such negotiations.

For this reason the essence of any measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons should consist in preventing a dangerous development of the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form and under any pretext. At the meeting of 2 July the delegation of the Soviet Union gave a detailed exposition of all the provisions which should be contained in a treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, stating first and foremost that such a treaty could be effective only if it precluded --

"... any possibility for their dissemination, and would close every loop-hole of access to these weapons by those who do not now possess them but are striving at all costs to gain direct or at least indirect access to them, either by establishing their own national control over nuclear weapons or by participating within the framework of military alliances in the possession, disposal and control of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.195, p.15).

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

What is the attitude of the delegation of the United States of America to all these efforts and proposals? What kind of answer did Mr. Foster see fit to give at a time when we all had every reason to hope that the Western nuclear Powers -- and in the first place the United States of America -- would consider it possible to take into account the clearly-expressed and unambiguous hopes that they would not close the way to negotiations on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and would not take any steps which might have irreparable consequences on the prospects for these negotiations

The answer was very laconic and, at the same time, very eloquent: "those participating in the discussions on the multilateral force have no intention of suspending those discussions" (ENDC/PV.213, p.65). That is what Mr. Foster said. We hope that the answer given here was not the final answer of the Western Powers, and particularly not the final answer of the United States of America. Otherwise the prospects for our negotiations on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- a question the importance of which for our negotiations on disarmament is not denied at all -- would be more than gloomy.

There is yet another question on our Committee's agenda which is directly linked with the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and consequently with the problem of slowing down the nuclear arms race, a question the solution of which may also be regarded as a preparatory step which would simplify the solution of the problem of reducing the threat of nuclear war. That is the question of establishing nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

The Bulgarian delegation is of the opinion that that question should not to any extent or at any time be overlooked by us, because it had not been left for a single moment outside the attention of world public opinion and the United Nations. The interest of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in the problem of establishing zones free from nuclear weapons and missiles, and the particular importance which it attaches to the solution of the problem, are well known. They have been reflected in a clear and unambiguous manner in declarations made by our most responsible statesmen, and in the attitude of the Bulgarian delegation towards this question at sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. The attitude of the Bulgarian Government and public opinion in our country towards this question has not in the least changed today. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Mr. Ivan Bashev, has stated:

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"There can be no doubt about the fact that the establishment of nuclear-free zones, by reducing the possibility of military conflicts and preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons to new countries and regions in the world, would considerably contribute to the improvement of international relations." (A/PV.1225, p.16)

The idea of nuclear-free zones has a relatively short but an important history. This idea has been approved by world public opinion, and in recent years has been embodied in a number of specific proposals, in United Nations General Assembly resolutions, and in the resolutions of various important international meetings, such as the Conference of African States in Addis Ababa in May 1963 (ENDC/93/Rev.1) and the Conference of the Organization for African Unity in July 1964.

The problem of establishing nuclear-free zones has been discussed more than once in our Committee as well. Its importance for the negotiations on disarmament has been stressed both by the socialist delegations and by delegations from the non-aligned States. Let me recall what the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Mbu, said in this regard at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee held on 6 May 1963:

"The logic of our support of atom-free zones is easily tenable. First, the trend towards denuclearization clearly constitutes a manifestation of States in self-defence against the perpetual subjugation of human destiny to the risk of an accidental nuclear war. Secondly, the trend toward denuclearization is supported because the establishment of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world could contribute considerably towards the relaxation of international tension and facilitate the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.128, p.19).

This point of view is now receiving very wide support, which is being expressed in an increasingly resolute and active manner, so aptly summarized by the representative of the Soviet Union on 20 August when he said:

"If any of the nuclear Powers, or a military group allied to one of them, cannot decide to accept an agreement on disarmament and give up its nuclear weapons, but still holds on to them as a means of achieving its political aims, then that Power should keep its nuclear weapons in its own territory." (ENDC/PV.209, p.32).

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Such is the wish of the peoples, and with each day this wish is being expressed more clearly and specifically.

The majority of representatives will probably remember the discussion in the First Committee at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in connexion with a draft resolution submitted by a number of African States proposing that the African continent should be declared a nuclear-free zone (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1). In explaining the negative attitude of the United States of America towards that draft resolution, the United States representative, Mr. Arthur Dean, said the following:

"Suppose, for example, that an African State is under attack and that the non-African attacker has nuclear weapons.... Sub-paragraph (b) of the draft resolution ... states that nuclear weapons should not be stored or transported in Africa. Surely, in view of the basic concepts of the United Nations Charter, this is not supposed to place a burden upon African States which is not placed upon other areas and to interfere with the right of African States to defend themselves by the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons."
(A/C.1/PV.1190, p.27)

Today a statement of that kind sounds anachronistic indeed, and in any case it could hardly deserve consideration in a discussion of disarmament problems. But it shows very clearly how far we have progressed since 1961 on the question of nuclear-free zones. I think that the argument about the "right" of States in Asia, Africa and Latin America to seek "security" and "protection" in a thermonuclear conflict on their territories now sound extremely unconvincing, to say the least. I think that on the contrary -- and this is absolutely beyond question -- that those States are now trying to find considerably better guarantees both for their own security and for peace throughout the world by insisting that the nuclear Powers should "leave them in peace"; they are insisting on the application of another "right" of theirs -- the right of their peoples to be delivered from the threat of a possible nuclear war which will undoubtedly reduce their towns and villages to ashes if any of their "well-wishers" locates nuclear weapons and missiles in their territories.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria fully shares the view that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has a direct obligation to help towards the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and that the creation of zones of this kind and their recognition under international law would

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in many ways help the negotiations on general and complete disarmament as well. We believe that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should help in the most active way to solve this important problem by adopting a recommendation on the desirability of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and particularly in areas where the danger of nuclear war is greatest -- for instance, in Central Europe, in the Mediterranean area and the Balkans, and in Northern Europe.

It cannot be denied that one such area is the Balkans and the Mediterranean. As is well known, among its foreign-policy measures the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has for a number of years given, and still gives, a high priority to its efforts and concern to transform the Balkan peninsula from the "powder keg" of Europe, as it formerly used to be, into a zone of peace, security and mutual understanding between nations. Guided by this unchanging political line, the Bulgarian Government has warmly supported the idea of declaring the Balkans to be an area free from nuclear weapons and missiles. The Bulgarian Government is deeply convinced, not only that agreement between the Balkan Powers on this question is quite possible, but also that the implementation of the idea is in keeping with the interests of the security of all Balkan peoples without any exception.

If the Western Powers for their part express their willingness -- as clearly as the Soviet Union has done (ENDC/123, p.4) -- to guarantee the status of nuclear-free zones wherever and whenever they are established, this could and undoubtedly would have a favourable effect in speeding up a solution of the problem of nuclear-free zones, particularly in areas where life itself and special circumstances give a great practical value to the idea of nuclear-free zones.

Turning to questions on the agenda for today's meeting, I shall dwell briefly on the proposals for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries to within their own national boundaries. As has been quite rightly pointed out in the Soviet Government's memorandum of 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123), the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European States would be of particularly great importance. This seems quite logical to us, as it is in Europe -- which has been the breeding-ground of two world wars -- that vast military contingents belonging to the two opposing military groupings are now located. It is impossible not to agree that this abnormal situation, created in peace-time, is fraught with serious dangers and that here the spark of a new conflagration could easily be struck.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

In our opinion the stationing of foreign troops in the territories of European States cannot be justified in any way. We cannot agree with the assertion that the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of Western European States would upset "the balance of forces" and would create some kind of military advantages for the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The flimsiness of this argument has been demonstrated by the representatives of socialist countries at a number of the Committee's meetings. In the light of these explanations it is quite clear that the implementation of the Soviet proposal could cause neither military nor political detriment to any European State.

The events of recent days, to which reference has been made in the Committee and about which the representative of the Soviet Union has spoken so convincingly, have emphasized with additional force the particular importance and urgency of the problem of withdrawing foreign troops. Unfortunately, the States which have stationed a considerable part of their armed forces in the territories of other countries are continuing to follow the same path, which is highly dangerous for the cause of peace and the security of the peoples. A few days ago, for instance, the Press contained reports of an agreement reached -- in spite of energetic protests by the Japanese people -- between the Governments of the United States of America and Japan to allow United States submarines equipped with Polaris missiles to be based in Japanese ports.

The Bulgarian people, near whose frontiers United States and United Kingdom armed forces are located on the southern flank of NATO, energetically supports the proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. The Bulgarian delegation believes that this critical international problem can and should be solved. And the more quickly this can be done, the better the consequences will be for the cause of peace and disarmament.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches great importance to the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries (ENEC/77). Our attitude is governed by the consideration that the implementation of this proposal would be a practical addition to, and a further development of, one of the important principles of peaceful co-existence between States, on which the foreign policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is based.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Members of the Committee will recall that as long ago as July 1955, at the Geneva consultation between the Heads of Governments of the four Powers, the Soviet Government put forward a proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two military and political groupings.^{1/} From then onwards, both in unilateral statements by the Government of the Soviet Union and in joint declarations by the States parties to the Warsaw Pact, the socialist countries have been constantly appealing to the Western Powers to put this proposal into effect.

In recalling these facts I have no intention of tracing in chronological order the whole history of the efforts made by the socialist countries to improve the relations between the two most powerful military and political groupings and thereby to improve international relations as a whole. I should merely like to point out that, if the NATO countries were also guided by the same sincere desire for the normalization of relations between these two groupings and for the removal of suspicion and the strengthening of confidence, they have more than once had an opportunity to confirm this by expressing their readiness to conclude a non-aggression pact with the States parties to the Warsaw Pact. We are bound to note, however, that the Western Powers did not avail themselves of that opportunity at the time. They adopted a negative attitude towards the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and evaded any serious businesslike discussion of this measure.

It is with even greater regret that we are compelled to note that the Western representatives have continued to evade a businesslike discussion of this proposal in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as well, and have thereby prevented agreement. Yet, as has been emphasized over and over again in the Committee, the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact does not affect the balance of forces between the two military and political groupings. It is not linked with the question of control, and the implementation of this measure would not come up against any objective difficulties and obstacles. This is quite evident from the fact that the representatives of the West were not in a position to justify their refusal to conclude a non-aggression pact by any convincing arguments. The objections put forward by the Western delegations were of a purely formal nature and showed least of all a businesslike attitude towards this serious and important question.

^{1/} United Kingdom White Papers: Cmd.9543, pp.21 et seq., Cmd.9633, Annex II, pp.104 et seq. (1955)

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

The representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament very often talk about the need for strengthening confidence. They avail themselves of any pretext to try to convince the Committee that the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty are purely defensive and that its members have no aggressive intentions. If that is so, how is one to reconcile the negative attitude of the Western delegations in regard to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with their solemn assertions and declarations about their peaceful intentions? This negative attitude towards the non-aggression pact is still being maintained by the Western countries, notwithstanding --

First, a certain improvement in the international situation as a result of the steps taken in 1963 and the agreements reached;

Secondly, the opinion of the world at large and of prominent social and political figures and responsible Western statesmen; it is well known that in the Eighteen-Nation Committee the delegations of the Western countries are the only ones which up to now have been opposing the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and even any discussion of this question;

Thirdly, the claims of the Western delegations regarding the goodwill, flexibility and constructive spirit which they are displaying;

Fourthly, the flexible attitude of the Soviet Union in regard to the form of such an international agreement, and

Fifthly, the commitment assumed on 25 July 1963 by the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to consult with their Allies in NATO -- "...about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants." (ENDC/101,p.2). As more than a year has passed since this commitment was signed, the Committee is entitled to know what progress towards the achievement of agreement "satisfactory to all participants" has been achieved as a result of consultations between NATO countries.

The questions which we have discussed and are discussing in the Eighteen-Nation Committee are of concern to all mankind. The viewpoints of the States represented here are clear enough. The problem dealt with will be further discussed at the forthcoming nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. On the majority of these proposals agreement is more than urgent. This includes the proposals which

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have been discussed today. We shall hope that they will be successfully solved within the very near future. It is for the sake of this -- and this only -- that we call a spade a spade, point out the difficulties that arise, and criticize those who are still not prepared to pass on from talk about disarmament and the reduction of international tension to a businesslike and courageous solution of the problem of disarmament and of measures connected with or facilitating it.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): First of all, I should like to associate my delegation with the words of welcome extended to our colleague Mr. Lind, representative of Sweden, on his return to our Committee.

In conformity with the agreement regarding the agenda for this meeting, I should like to submit certain considerations concerning two of the collateral measures submitted to our Committee in the Soviet Government's Memorandum of 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123): namely, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States.

The Romanian delegation attaches particular importance to the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two military groupings in Europe, as we have had occasion to state both in the General Assembly and in this Committee. We are convinced that in present-day conditions the conclusion of such a pact would very greatly contribute to the elimination of one of the main sources of tension in international relations, and strengthen peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

The whole evolution of the post-war period shows that peace and security, in equal measure for all, cannot be obtained through the perpetuation of military blocs and the so-called balance of armaments, more accurately termed the balance of terror. That is why, as Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej, President of the Council of State of the Romanian People's Republic, recently reaffirmed, Romania, "as a member of the Warsaw Pact Organization, is in favour of the liquidation of all military blocs and of the conclusion, as a transitional measure, of a non-aggression pact between that organization and NATO."

The Romanian delegation notes that the importance and scope of such a measure has already been stressed several times in this Committee. Not only the delegations of the socialist countries but also those of certain non-aligned States, for example,

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

Burma to-day, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic have expressed themselves in favour of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organizations. This idea received a favourable echo in the West, too, and we feel we are entitled to assert that the number of those in favour of the conclusion of such a pact of non-aggression is continually increasing.

We all recall the importance of the statement made in this connexion by the late President of the United States, Mr. J.F. Kennedy (ENDC/95), the statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Spaak, (A/PV.1233, provisional, p.59-60), and others. Quite recently President Johnson said:

"Peace is more than the absence of aggression. It is the creation of a world community in which every nation can follow its own course without fear of its neighbours".

Would not a non-aggression pact contribute more than any other such measure to the reduction and elimination of the mutual fears and suspicions which still bedevil the relationships between States? In our view, that is why the three nuclear Powers, the original signatories of the Moscow Treaty, included in the agreed communiqué issued in Moscow on 25 July 1963 (ENDC/101) the passage which was quoted today by our co-Chairman Mr. Tsarapkin.

But we note with regret that nothing that has so far happened entitles us to say that there is any prospect of progress in that direction. Have the consultations among the NATO Powers not finished yet? As for our Committee, we think it could very usefully have continued during this session to examine the draft pact (ENDC/77) which has been so long in its archives. To be sure, a non-aggression pact hardly constitutes in itself a practical manifestation of ideal international relations. But the existence of opposing military groupings has encouraged and still encourages the arms race, and also creates an increasing danger to the peace and security of all peoples.

I consider that the arguments submitted by those representatives who have spoken before me — Mr. Tsarapkin of the Soviet Union and Mr. Lukanov of Bulgaria — are quite pertinent. Naturally, a non-aggression pact would in no wise affect the defensive capacity of States members of the two groupings — or, to use the language of certain of our Western colleagues, their defensive dispositions.

Thus the proposed non-aggression pact would be merely a first step towards implementing other collateral measures; it would create a climate more favourable to the normalization of relations.

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between the States belonging to the two military groupings. In short, it would create an atmosphere of trust which, through calm negotiations carried out with strict respect for mutual interests, would facilitate the solution of the pressing problem of the liquidation of the last vestiges of the Second World War, and the conclusion of a treaty of peace on Germany. The result would be such an improvement in the international climate that it would become possible to pass on to the application of measures which today seem somewhat remote.

Numerous objections have been invoked against that reasonable and useful measure, but in our view these objections are groundless. Since the Romanian delegation has already had occasion to reply to some of those arguments, I shall only make a brief reference to them.

It has been said that a non-aggression pact would be useless, on the ground that it would merely repeat the provisions of the United Nations Charter. But the proclaiming of an accepted principle is never useless, for the principle is thus reaffirmed, given more concrete form, and anchored more firmly and more deeply in the juridical conscience of the peoples of the world, who are in this way mobilized against those who would seek to disregard that principle. That is why the Charter reiterates and confirms so many general and universally recognized principles of international law. That is also why so many General Assembly resolutions and international treaties reaffirm the principles of the Charter.

It has also been said that this Committee would not be the most suitable forum for a discussion of that proposal, because it does not comprise all the States members of the two groupings (ENDC/PV.100,p.50). That is perfectly true; but, if that is to constitute an argument against our right to examine and solve this problem, then a fortiori we should not be competent to examine and adopt a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Such a treaty should bind all States -- there are over a hundred of them --; and, by definition, this Committee only comprises eighteen Powers.

Certain difficulties have been invoked in connexion with the fact that the conclusion of the pact might oblige certain States to recognize an international situation which they do not want to recognize. In our view, that should not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the realization of our common objective. The example of the Moscow Treaty proves that, when we all seek a concrete result, the necessary means can be found, without imposing acts of recognition on unwilling States.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

It has been held, as an objection to the proposed pact, that the North Atlantic Treaty is in any case merely a defensive pact. But, if that is so, we see all the less reason for hesitation regarding the conclusion of the proposed non-aggression pact, which, pending a radical solution to the problems in dispute would provide an additional guarantee of security to European and other States.

In reality, no argument can justify the lack of a decision regarding that measure, whose utility, I repeat, was likewise recognized in the communiqué of the three Powers signatories of the Moscow Treaty.

I should now like to speak briefly on the second problem on our agenda, namely, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. Today, twenty years after the Second World War, foreign troops and military bases are still to be found on the territories of dozens of countries, in Europe, Asia, Africa and other parts of the world, as a corollary to the existence of certain military blocs. I do not wish to dwell on the compatibility or otherwise of these foreign bases and troops with the principle of the sovereign equality of States, or with that of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. What is indisputable is that they constitute focuses of tension in the international situation and a grave threat to the peace and security of the world.

We are reminded of this danger nearly every day, be it in South Vietnam, Asia in general, Cyprus or Guantanamo. As you know, there are 21 foreign air bases and 12 naval bases in Africa alone. It is hardly necessary to recall the position adopted and the steps taken by African States in this connexion.

As you also know, at the 12th Pugwash Conference, held in India from 27 January to 1 February 1964, 70 scientists belonging to 25 countries unanimously adopted a declaration calling for the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories and for the liquidation of foreign military bases. While so many peoples are struggling to achieve the economic and political consolidation of the independence which they have won at the cost of so many sacrifices, these bases infringe the right of those peoples to self-determination, for they are being used, in the cases familiar to all of us, as the instruments of the neo-colonialist policy of interference in the internal affairs of States.

The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops is all the more important since the Western Powers have not only shown no desire to carry out such a withdrawal but have signified their intention to build new bases of that type. In this connexion it is enough, we think, to cite a single example: the United States of America and

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the United Kingdom have decided, according to the Press, to build new military bases, this time in the Pacific Ocean, which, as was stressed significantly in the relevant communiqué, "could naturally be extremely useful as strongholds for troops"

During our recent discussions on general and complete disarmament, certain Western representatives, among them the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, spoke at length on the problem of peace-keeping machinery. I should like to point out in that connexion that, whatever the character of the international forces to be created by agreement in the future, they should in no circumstances serve as an instrument of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of peoples.

Any measure aimed at the liquidation of foreign military bases and at the withdrawal of troops stationed in foreign territories would considerably improve the international political climate, enable States to reduce their military budgets, and facilitate several other measures before our Committee. The Romanian delegation declares in favour of the speediest possible application of such measures, so as to contribute to an improvement in the international climate, to the consolidation of the sovereignty of nations, and to the promotion of the cause of disarmament.

Mr. KLUSAK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I should like to join the speakers who preceded me in welcoming Mr. Lind, the head of the Swedish delegation.

In accordance with the programme for today's meeting, I should like to state briefly the position of the Czechoslovak delegation in regard to the proposals of the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/77) and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of other States (ENDC/123).

The Committee has already devoted considerable attention to the draft proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. The discussions that have taken place here on this subject have confirmed that the idea of concluding such a pact has been favourably received and supported by a number of delegations. Besides the delegations of the socialist countries, the delegations of the great majority of the non-aligned countries have also stressed the usefulness of concluding such a pact.

This fact shows that the draft proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is meeting with ever great support throughout the world, and this is confirmed

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by the discussion on the subject at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, where a number of other States also spoke in favour of it. It is significant, as has already been mentioned here today, that ever-widening circles in many States members of NATO are also speaking in favour of the conclusion of such a pact. It is well known, for instance, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Spaak, has also stressed its usefulness on various occasions.

This situation shows convincingly that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would play its role in reducing international tension, in dispelling the existing lack of confidence in the relations between States, and in reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. Thus favourable conditions would be brought about for more rapid progress in solving other problems, including the problem of general and complete disarmament. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact would help towards enhancing the role of international law in the relations between States and would thus strengthen the legal basis on which the contemporary international community rests. In a wider context it would undoubtedly lead to giving further strength and vitality to the political, economic and cultural relations between the States belonging to the two groupings, relations which in recent years have been marked by a comparatively more favourable development. Thus the basis for the peaceful co-existence of these States would be still further strengthened and extended. Since the matter concerns States and groupings which at the present time possess tremendous military might and which include all the nuclear Powers, it is obvious that such a development would have a favourable impact also on the situation in the world as a whole.

Those were the basic considerations by which the socialist countries were guided in putting forward and urging the acceptance of the draft proposal for the conclusion of a pact. In this connexion I should like to emphasize that the proposals for the conclusion of a pact and the implementation of other measures that would lead to the lessening of tension in Europe, to a reduction of the danger of an outbreak of war, and to the creation of a system of collective security in that part of the world, derive from the very essence of the Warsaw Treaty. This alliance of socialist States is of an exclusively defensive nature and is not aimed against any State or group of States.

The Warsaw Treaty itself was concluded with a view to creating, eventually, an all-European system of collective security. That is why it is directly stated in the text of the Treaty that it is open to all other States - irrespective of their social and govern-

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ment systems - that express their readiness through adherence to the Treaty to help unite the efforts of the peace-loving States in order to safeguard the peace and security of the peoples. At the same time it is stated directly in the Treaty that, in the event of agreement being reached in regard to the creation of a collective system of security in Europe, the Treaty shall cease to have effect. Moreover, all the signatory States have assumed an obligation to make steadfast efforts to secure the creation of such a system of all-European security.

These provisions of the Warsaw Treaty prove that the socialist countries are consistently endeavouring to ensure equal security for all States in a system of collective security, and do not place above the interests of general security their own defensive alliance, the creation of which was a reply to the development which had taken place within the framework of NATO, and mainly to the inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany in that grouping.

The delegations of the countries members of NATO very often emphasize that the North Atlantic Alliance likewise pursues exclusively the interests of the defence and security of its member States. If that is really so, then, as has already been pointed out here, nothing should stand in the way of reaching agreement in regard to the proposed pact, the purpose of which is precisely to reduce the danger of an armed conflict between the two groupings.

After all, the principal obligation which the States of the two groupings would assume under a non-aggression pact would be, as the representative of the Soviet Union has already pointed out today, that they would refrain in their relations with one another and in international relations in general from any aggression, threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. At the same time they would undertake to settle their mutual disputes by peaceful means only.

That is why we consider that no State or group of States that wishes solely and exclusively to strengthen its security, and harbours no aggressive designs in regard to other States, can adduce any serious argument that would prevent it from concluding a pact such as the proposed non-aggression pact would be.

In this connexion I should like to point out that we fully realize that the signing of a pact would not mean that all the problems in the relations between the States of the two groupings would be resolved. But the draft proposal by no means sets itself such an aim. We are convinced that the conclusion of a pact would help

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towards reducing the tension between them, towards strengthening mutual confidence, and thereby towards reducing the danger of an outbreak of war.

But despite all these considerations, which clearly speak in favour of the immediate conclusion of a non-aggression pact, in the discussions the Western Powers have so far taken a negative point of view in regard to this draft proposal. It is characteristic, however, that the objections which they put forward to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact usually have no bearing on its substance but are simply confined to various assertions of a more or less formal, procedural nature. The delegations of the socialist countries have already refuted these objections in the past, as well as in the course of today's discussions, on the basis of many cogent arguments, and have shown their lack of foundation.

It appears, however, that the true reason for the negative attitude of the Western countries towards the conclusion of a non-aggression pact lies much deeper. In fact, it lies in their unwillingness to accept the principal obligation which would derive from the pact: namely, to renounce the use of force in settling disputes. Moreover, it must be pointed out that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is obviously the principal objector in this regard, as the representative of the Soviet Union has convincingly demonstrated here today. The interested circles in the Federal Republic of Germany make no secret of the fact that their hostility towards the pact is determined above all by the circumstance that its conclusion would involve confirmation of the existing situation in Europe, its stabilization, as well as the assumption of an obligation not to change this situation by means of force and aggression.

The opposition of the Western countries to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as showing that they identify themselves with the position of the Federal Republic of Germany. Evidence of this is provided, among other things, by the statements made by some of their representatives during the previous discussion of the draft proposal for a non-aggression pact. Their assertions to the effect that the conclusion of a pact would prejudice their attitude towards recognition of the German Democratic Republic likewise do not stand up to criticism, it appears since the socialist countries have already stated unequivocally

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a good many times that this question could be settled by an appropriate mutually acceptable form of conclusion of the pact.

The fact that by their negative attitude towards the conclusion of a non-aggression pact the Western Powers are practically identifying themselves with the revenge-seeking aspirations of the Federal Republic of Germany is a matter for reflection and is bound to cause concern. After all, no one can have any illusions about the fact that any attempt to alter the existing situation in Europe - not to mention any attempt to bring about such an alteration by means of force - would inevitably be fraught with the most serious consequences, which would hardly be limited to Europe.

That is why it would be in the interests, not only of the European countries but of all other countries in the world, to take advantage of any possibility of averting this danger. The draft proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is undoubtedly one such possibility. Therefore priority should be given to the discussion of this question in the Committee. In our opinion, that would be in accordance with the joint communiqué (ENDC/101) issued in July 1963 by the three great Powers at the conclusion of the Moscow talks, which have already been mentioned here. It is now for the Western Powers to adopt in regard to this question such an attitude as would be in keeping with the interests of peace in Europe and throughout the world, and not to subordinate their attitude to the demands of the revenge-seeking circles in the Federal Republic of Germany; that, in our opinion, is the main obstacle standing in the way of agreement on the conclusion of a pact.

In the next part of my statement I intend to make a few comments in connexion with the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries (ENDC/123). During the spring session the Czechoslovak delegation expressed its full support for that very important proposal which, not intentionally, is given first place in the memorandum of the Soviet Government (ENDC/123) of 28 January 1964. We then stressed with complete justification (ENDC/PV.164 pp. 23, 24) the exceptional importance which that proposal has for the reduction of international tension in various parts of the world, particularly in Central Europe.

(Mr. Klusak, Czechoslovakia)

As is well known, the Soviet proposal is based on the premise that the best solution would be the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government has stated in its memorandum that, if the Western Powers are not yet prepared for such a radical solution, it is ready to conclude an agreement to reduce the numbers of foreign troops and to withdraw them gradually from the territories of other countries.

In the few months which have passed since the Soviet Government's memorandum of 28 January 1964 was submitted, the urgent need for the adoption and implementation of the proposal to withdraw foreign troops from the territories of other countries has become even more evident. A number of recent events, the seriousness of which has also been pointed out here in the Committee, provide eloquent evidence of the danger threatening world peace and the independent development and security of many peoples as a result of the presence of foreign troops in their national territories.

A typical instance in this regard is the area of South-East Asia, which has already been for many years a hotbed teeming with threats of a world conflagration. The Western Powers, and in particular the United States, have concentrated in that area powerful land, naval and air forces, the presence of which does not help towards solving the prolonged internal problems of that area but, on the contrary, seriously complicates them and creates a situation in which local conflicts threaten to spread to other areas; this may lead to extremely dangerous consequences on a world scale. The United States, which has stationed its armed forces in the territories of its allies, also arrogates to itself the right to trespass on the territory, air space and territorial waters of a number of other countries. What the outcome of this practice is likely to be is shown by the recent aggressive actions against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. United States armed forces have undertaken aggressive military operations against the sovereign territory of that country; they are systematically violating its air space and have no respect for its territorial waters. They are using the same method in regard to other countries of that area -- Laos and Cambodia.

The events in South-East Asia and the dangerous situation in other areas, particularly in Cyprus, confirm the urgent need to adopt without delay the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries.

(Mr. Klusak, Czechoslovakia)

In all those cases the presence of foreign armed forces is one of the sources of protracted crises, which could at any moment lead to armed conflicts, the danger of which is now generally recognized. It is not by chance that more and more countries are speaking in favour of a rapid solution of this problem and are demanding the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from their territories, as well as the liquidation of foreign military bases.

In this connexion the efforts of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to put an end once and for all to the presence of foreign troops and the existence of foreign military bases in its territory deserve to be fully supported. Those foreign troops and bases have played an extremely unbecoming part in the present tragic events. We likewise fully support the just demand of Cuba concerning the liquidation of the United States military base of Guantanamo situated on its territory. The United States Government not only refuses to satisfy this demand but is intensifying still further its aggressive campaign against Cuba.

Also deserving of attention are the numerous statements of leading personalities of various countries demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops and the liquidation of foreign bases on the territories of other countries. Many of those statements have been quoted during our discussions. I refer, for instance, to the demand which was formulated in the resolution adopted at the Conference of Heads of States of African Countries in Addis Ababa in May 1963, which was circulated as a document of our Committee (ENDC/93/Rev.1). In that resolution the States taking part in the Conference undertook to bring about by means of negotiation the end of military occupation of the African continent and the elimination of military bases.

Already in the past the Czechoslovak delegation, when discussing the question of foreign bases in the territories of other countries, has emphasized its exceptional importance for Central Europe. We point out the fact that the presence of such troops is a constant source of tension in that area, which is truly a key area for the maintenance of peace. At present, when the world is commemorating the fiftieth and twenty-fifth anniversaries of the outbreak of the First and Second World Wars, which, as is well known, broke out by no mere chance precisely in Europe, it is urgently necessary to carry out measures which would help towards eliminating the most dangerous sources likely to make that area for the third time the focus of a world conflagration, which this time would be a nuclear one.

(Mr. Klusak, Czechoslovakia)

The memorandum of the Soviet Government (ENDC/123) very justifiably speaks in this connexion of the urgent need for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European countries in which are concentrated large masses of troops and armaments of the two main military groupings -- of NATO on the one hand, and of the Warsaw Pact on the other. Today more and more people, not only in Europe but throughout the world, realize that as long as foreign troops, mainly American, remain in Europe, particularly in the territory of Germany, there will continue to exist a serious threat of a world military conflict breaking out in Europe.

The Western Powers try to justify the stationing of foreign armed forces in the territories of a number of European countries by asserting that their presence is necessary in order to ensure the security of those countries and to preserve peace in Europe. Yet all the experience of post-war developments shows that that way is unlikely to lead to such a goal. Such a policy of the Western Powers leads to quite the opposite results. It is a permanent source of international tension and mistrust between States; it increases the danger of a vast armed conflict breaking out. It reinforces the dangerous situation in various areas of the world which I have already mentioned. Europe is no exception in this regard.

The practicable way towards ensuring the peace and security of all European countries lies in a different direction. This aim could be achieved by adopting and implementing proposals which would help towards improving the atmosphere, reducing tension, and strengthening mutual confidence among the countries of Europe. The proposals for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries and for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States are among the most important. But other proposals put forward in the past also lead to the same objective. Some of them are contained in the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Government to our Committee for consideration on 28 January 1964. I have in mind especially the proposal to create denuclearized zones in various parts of Europe, measures to prevent surprise attack, and effective measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Adoption of the proposal of the Polish People's Republic to freeze nuclear armaments in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1; PV.189,p.6), as well as the proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic that both German States should renounce nuclear weapons, (ENDC/124, 133), would also help towards

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improving the situation in Europe. Further evidence of the consistent efforts of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to strengthen peace and security in Europe is its new proposal of 2 September 1964 that the two German States should renounce nuclear weapons and that their territories should be transformed into denuclearized zones, and also regarding other measures which have been expounded in detail in the statement made today by the representative of the Soviet Union. In our opinion the implementation of these proposals would contribute to the progress and further development of Europe in the right peaceful direction in accordance with the interests of the peace-loving peoples of Europe and of the whole world. For these reasons we fully support them.

The importance of the measures contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Government of 28 January 1964 for the strengthening of international peace and security was again emphasized in the joint statement adopted at the end of the talks which recently took place during the visit to Czechoslovakia of the Party and Government delegation of the Soviet Union, in which among other things it was pointed out:

" All these proposals, as well as many others that have been submitted by the socialist countries in the United Nations and the Eighteen-Nation Committee, represent objectives which can certainly be achieved, and the implementation of which is possible immediately. From their implementation the cause of universal peace will gain and humanity will advance towards general and complete disarmament."

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): The hour is late, but I think it is important that nevertheless some comments be made on what has been said here today, and some other points that I wish to make be put forward at this time.

The Soviet delegation and other delegations have today spoken on the question of a non-aggression pact between NATO members and the parties to the Warsaw Pact. These delegations have also spoken on the reduction and withdrawal of troops. Under our rules of procedure, the Soviet Union had the right to indicate the topics on which it intended to speak. Therefore the United States did not object when the Soviet Union announced at last Thursday's meeting that its topics would be a non-aggression pact and the withdrawal of troops.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

We deeply regret the fact that in his remarks on these topics the Soviet representative descended to distortions, misstatements and false accusations regarding the policies and intentions of the United States and its allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany. His charges are not new; they have been refuted on many occasions. They are so far from the facts that I can but wonder what his purpose is in raising them again and in attempting to divert this Committee from its responsibilities and opportunities to move towards a world of reduced tension and reduced armaments.

I should like to make it clear why the United States does not consider these two topics appropriate for consideration in this forum. Speaking of a non-aggression pact, Mr. Stelle said at our meeting of 26 April 1963:

"We are concerned in this Committee with matters relating to disarmament and to the control of armaments. We are not here seized of general political problems, and we are particularly not seized of those problems specifically related to European regional security matters." (ENDC/PV.125, p.20)

The United States maintains its view that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee is not the appropriate forum for consideration of this question. There are a number of substantive disarmament measures, such as those we have proposed to this Conference, which are of the type of practical, realistic measure upon which agreement is possible and to which the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee could more usefully address itself.

I should like to comment, however, on the allegation by the Soviet representative that the United States has not fulfilled its commitment undertaken in connexion with the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to consult its allies on the subject of a non-aggression pact and to continue the discussion of this matter with the Soviet Government. That charge is not in accordance with the facts. In the agreed joint communiqué (ENDC/101) issued in Moscow on 25 July 1963 which announced the agreement on the limited test-ban Treaty, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States noted their discussion of the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact and agreed -- "to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks".

(Mr. Foster, United States)

They also stated their agreement: "to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants."

In this connexion I should like to correct a misinterpretation of President Kennedy's position on this matter after the initialling of the nuclear test-ban Treaty in Moscow. In his statement of 26 July 1963 to the people of the United States on this matter, he said:

"The Moscow talks reached no agreement on any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter.

"Under-Secretary Harriman made it clear that any non-aggression arrangements across the division in Europe would require full consultation with our allies and full attention to their interests."

(ENDC/102, p.3)

Subsequently the United States discussed the matter in some detail with its allies. Despite the strong reservations generally felt about a non-aggression pact, certain tentative views emerged from these consultations and were subsequently conveyed by the United States Government directly to the Soviet Government. Though no prospect of agreement emerged from that exchange of views with the Soviet Government, the United States felt that it was useful in clarifying the positions of both sides. There the matter stands among the parties concerned; and I do not intend to enter into the substance of it here.

With regard to the question of the withdrawal of troops from Europe, it should be obvious to the Soviet delegation that similar problems are presented by this topic as a subject for discussion in this forum. The United States does not consider this to be a fruitful subject for discussion. The whole question of forces in Europe and its related political aspects, as the Soviet Union is quite aware, is closely related to serious unresolved political problems in that area.

I should like now to turn to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The danger of dissemination of nuclear weapons is of great concern to all of us. At our meeting of 2 July, Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin recognized that "there are some areas of common ground in the positions of the two sides" (ENDC/PV.195, p.6) on how to deal with this danger. Today I should like to discuss some of those "areas of common ground" which might be the basis for agreement or action at this time.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The possession of nuclear weapons gives awesome responsibilities, not special privileges, to the Soviet Union, the United States and every other nuclear Power. How has the United States sought to carry out those responsibilities? As I have said before, we offered first to give up our monopoly of atomic weapons if other nations would agree to subject their future nuclear activities to effective international control. This failing, we developed the kind of invulnerable forces we believed necessary to deter or repulse a nuclear attack upon ourselves or our allies. At the same time we developed intricate personnel, mechanical and electronic safeguards to prevent accidental or unauthorized explosion of our nuclear weapons, wherever they might be. Moreover, we adopted legislation designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the information necessary to manufacture such weapons to nations which had not already acquired their own capability. Finally, we have consistently sought agreements which would ultimately remove the nuclear threat and in the interim prevent its further spread. In years past this effort helped to produce an International Atomic Energy Agency Statute, an Antarctic Treaty, a test-ban Treaty and a United Nations resolution against placing nuclear weapons in orbit (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117).

The United States is prepared to take a variety of steps each of which would contribute to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Each is based also upon sufficient common interest to make early action possible.

First, the United States is prepared to negotiate an agreement in response to the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)). Such an agreement would commit nuclear Powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of States not now controlling them. Such an agreement would include also a corresponding undertaking by non-nuclear Powers not to acquire control of nuclear weapons. We all accept the urgent need for such an agreement. However, the Soviet Union has laboured our differences rather than emphasizing our common interests. It has held up agreement by insisting that certain NATO Governments abandon their negotiations to create a multilateral force.

We have stated repeatedly that the proposal for a multilateral force would not result in the creation of additional national nuclear weapon capabilities. In fact it would provide an alternative to the possible creation of such additional national capabilities. Nuclear components of the force could not under any circumstances be used for the creation of additional national nuclear forces.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

That would be ensured not only by legal provisions and administrative controls, but also by the principle of mixed manning. Each ship of the multilateral-force fleet would be manned by nationals of at least three countries, with no nation providing more than 40 per cent of the personnel of any ship. The mixed-manning principle would be in force for all significant components and functions of the multilateral force. In no case would more than 40 per cent of any ship's company, including personnel directly concerned with maintenance or control of missiles, be from any one participating nation.

The charter for the multilateral force would provide that its missiles could be fired only by decision of an agreed number of participants, one of which would be the United States. No single nation could fire any of the weapons by national decision.

The force would be subject to the same type of safeguards to prevent accidental or unauthorized use as are nuclear weapons of the United States. These safeguards would make it impossible for any or all of the personnel aboard a multilateral-force ship to fire any multilateral-force missile except on the explicit order of the multilateral control board, which would of course not be aboard the ship. One of the ways by which this result would be brought about would be by inserting a control mechanism in the weapon system which would make it impossible for the weapons to be armed or fired by anyone aboard the ship without certain information. That information could be supplied only from outside the ship.

The safeguards would also protect against disclosure of weapon design data. Participation in the multilateral force would not contribute significantly to the design, development or fabrication capability of any participating nation.

The Soviet Union continues to strengthen its missile arsenal targeted on Western Europe. The threat so posed gives the countries targeted a legitimate interest in participation in strategic nuclear deterrence. The multilateral force would provide for a sharing of nuclear deterrent responsibilities among NATO allies without promoting independent national nuclear forces.

For these reasons, the proposal being discussed in Paris will not be put on the negotiating table at Geneva. The United States does not intend to suspend or abandon the multilateral-force negotiations merely because the Soviet Union raises

(Mr. Foster, United States)

them as an excuse for its refusal to conclude now an agreement in response to the Irish resolution. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union would probably attempt to obstruct almost any effort to strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Alliance.

A second United States proposal which would help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is the cut-off of production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree to a complete cut-off or to a plant-by-plant shut-down. We are prepared to accept such a cut-off with or without the transfer of a large quantity of existing stocks of fissionable material to peaceful purposes.

The Soviet representative has apparently misunderstood this proposal. At our meeting of 13 August he claimed that its verification system (ENDC/134) would require disclosure of the following:

- (1) location of all plants producing fissionable material;
- (2) volume of current production of U-235 and plutonium;
- (3) volume of nuclear resources stockpiled; volume of stockpiles of individual types of nuclear weapons in possession of States; and, in any case, volume of stockpiles of weapons based on U-235 and plutonium production; and
- (4) the whole technology of the production of fissionable material (ENDC/PV.207, pp. 22,23).

I should like to touch on each of those points individually.

First, we are discussing a measure to stop all production of fissionable material for weapons. Therefore the disclosure of the location of plants which are no longer being used for weapon material production should not affect the security of States which propose to abide by the agreement.

Second, the system proposed by the United States does not make it possible to establish the volume of production of fissionable material before the cut-off. The only production which would be disclosed would be that which a nation wished to continue for peaceful purposes after the cut-off. The original capacity at the plants which are shut down or operated on a partial basis would not be revealed. Only the continuing peaceful production of a plant after the weapon cut-off would be known. The ratio of production after the cut-off to production before should be small. That ratio would not have to be disclosed. As a result, neither would the pre-cut-off production.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Third, no information would be disclosed on either the volume of fissionable material stockpiled or the volume of types of weapons in stockpile. In order to determine material stockpiles, it is necessary to have information on both plant capacity and past schedules. As already indicated, the original production capacity of plants that were shut down or operated on a partial basis would in no way be revealed. These would comprise the largest part of the total plant capacity. Furthermore, no information revealing past production schedules of any plants would be needed. Without schedules or capacity, the existing stocks of weapon material could not be computed. Even with figures on the existing stocks of material -- which the verification system would not provide -- it would be impossible to deduce figures on the stocks of weapons. The material stocks could be divided in an infinite number of ways into different weapon types. Thus, another insuperable obstacle would be erected to gaining information on the existing number of weapons.

Fourth, the United States proposal does not require disclosure of technology for the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. In the case of U-235 production, it was specifically stated that the access would be only to the perimeter of the process buildings, avoiding the necessity of revealing technology. In the case of plutonium production, only those reactors continuing to operate for non-weapon purposes would be given International Atomic Energy Agency or similar inspection. Initially, only those over 100 thermal megawatts would be inspected. The inspection would be of the same kind as a number of countries all over the world are now accepting as evidence that their plants do not produce fissionable material for weapon purposes.

Under our proposal, plants producing plutonium for weapon purposes would be shut down. All that would be needed in this case is a simple inspection to demonstrate that they were not operating. This would not require disclosure of either the production technology or the capacity of the plant. In the case of chemical-separation plants, a nation could avoid all internal inspection by substituting already-produced plutonium for that separated in the plant (ENDC/134, para IV B 2 (d, iii)).

In sum, the United States proposal has been designed to avoid disclosure of processes and capacities for production of fissionable materials for weapon

(Mr. Foster, United States)

purposes, as well as stockpiles of weapons and the material for weapons. The only disclosures would involve continuing programmes for peaceful purposes. Such disclosures all nations should be willing to make.

The United States is prepared to negotiate in another area relating to non-dissemination. We are prepared to discuss an agreement, or agreements, under which all transfers of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency or similar safeguards. Moreover, we urge all nations to accept international inspection of their own peaceful nuclear activities.

For the past two weeks the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy has been going on in the Palais des Nations. Yesterday Dr. H.D. Smyth, the United States representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the Conference:

"The question before the world is simple, though the answer to it may not be. Can the world enjoy the benefits of nuclear power without promoting the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

"We in the United States believe this is possible. We believe that a system of safeguards can be set up which could prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We believe this can be done without serious interference with the sovereignty of nations and without significant interference with the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. We believe that such a system is best administered by an international agency and can be effective if the world recognizes its necessity.

"Our convictions are based on twenty years of experience with nuclear reactors, large and small, on ten years of experience with bilateral safeguards, on three years of experience with the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and on exhaustive studies by technical and political experts."

We all have a common interest in securing the nuclear benefits of the peaceful atom without the nuclear danger and disorder of wider proliferation. I have listed a variety of proposals relating to non-dissemination. I should like now to describe the steps which the United States has recently taken even in the absence of further agreement here.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

First, as an immediate step, and to facilitate progress towards an agreement in response to the Irish resolution, we have declared that we do not intend to take any action inconsistent with that resolution. That is the declared policy of the United States. It was announced at our meeting held on 6 February (ENDC/164, p.8).

My delegation has warmly welcomed the important decision of the Indian Government not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, irrespective of any action that any other country may take (ENDC/211, p.14).

Secondly, we have announced cut-backs of our production of fissionable material (ENDC/132). Those cut-backs will amount to an over-all decrease in our production of plutonium by 20 per cent and of enriched uranium by 40 per cent. We are pleased to note that the Soviet Government (ENDC/131) and the United Kingdom Government have also announced cut-backs.

Thirdly, we have submitted the Yankee power reactor at Rowe, Massachusetts, to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The first visit by IAEA inspectors to the Yankee facility was carried out on 26 August 1964. We hope that the list of governments accepting such inspection will grow even longer -- and it would be quite appropriate for the governments represented here to take the lead. Here is a case where action, not merely talk, is possible now.

In conclusion, I should like to urge a redoubled effort to make use of the common ground that now exists between us. All nations represented here have an interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all that the amount of fissionable materials available for nuclear weapons should be restricted. It is in the interest of all that effective international safeguards should be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities of all States. It is in the interest of all that an agreement prohibiting proliferation should be reached.

The world is a little safer today because of the nuclear test ban. That is, however, as we all know here, a limited ban. We have yet to resolve the differences that prevent agreement on a comprehensive ban. However, this did not prevent agreement on the limited ban -- the widest area of agreement possible at that time. In the same manner we should seek the widest area of other action now possible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Progress can be made on the problem of proliferation if all of us approach it in that way. If not, the acquisition of national nuclear forces may become an uncontrolled chain reaction. All nations, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, do have an interest in preventing such a chain reaction from occurring.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): The representative of the Soviet Union wishes to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Exercising my right of reply, I wish to make a brief comment in connexion with the statement made by the representative of the United States.

According to what Mr. Foster has said, it appears that the United States has fulfilled its commitment laid down in the joint communiqué of 25 July 1963 (ENDC/101) by reason of the fact that the United States has consulted, without result, with its allies on the question of a non-aggression pact. We must state with regret that we cannot consider that statement of the United States representative as corresponding to what is stated in that regard in the Moscow joint communiqué of the three Powers -- the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom -- of 25 July 1963. In that communiqué it is not a question of consultations in general with the respective allies. The joint communiqué contains the commitment of the three Powers I have mentioned to consult with their allies, not in a general way, but with a definite purpose: namely, "... with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants." (ENDC/101).

It is obvious that the most essential part of the commitment has not been fulfilled. We, of course, should like to see on the part of the Western Powers the actions and policy that would be in conformity with that commitment of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. We expect the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to take further measures with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants: that is, a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact Organization.

As regards the other questions raised by the United States representative in his statement today, we shall of course study them attentively, but, according to what we gathered from the simultaneous interpretation, it seems to us that our previous remarks on all these questions remain completely valid.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): Before we turn to the communiqué, I should like to read out the following announcement by the co-Chairmen:

"The co-Chairmen recommend to the Committee that the meetings on 16 and 17 September be devoted to consideration of a draft report of the Committee to the General Assembly and to general discussion of matters before the Committee."

If there is no objection, I shall consider that recommendation adopted by the Committee.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): May I ask when the draft report is likely to be available to delegations for examination?

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I think the co-Chairmen would be in a better position to reply to that question.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): To tell the truth, we have not settled that question between us, but I think that my United States co-Chairman will agree with me that possibly at the beginning of next week -- that is, probably on Monday -- the draft report will be available to members of the Committee so that they can study it.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I believe that that reply will be satisfactory to the representative of Canada, and if that is so, and if there is no objection, I shall consider the recommendation of the co-Chairmen accepted.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 215th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. J. Goldblat, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Burma, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the United States and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 15 September 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.

